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THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REQUIREMENT OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11246 AND ITS EFFECT ON GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS, UNIONS AND MINORITY WORKERS
INTRODUCTION
Congress, with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
finally has made an effort to end a problem of long standing and of
national dimension - discrimination in employment. Title VII of the
Act specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin by an employer, employment agency or
labor organization. 2  The passage of this Act climaxed over twenty
years of debate on dozens of bills designed to solve the problem of
employment discrimination. And while it took Congress until 1964 to
act in this field, another branch of the federal government has been
involved, in varying degree and with varying success, for almost thirty
years.
3
The executive branch first became involved on June 25, 1941, when
President Roosevelt, reacting to a threatened demonstration march on
Washington by 100,000 Negroes, 4 promulgated Executive Order 8802'
prohibiting discrimination in government and in defense industries.
He stated:
I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there
shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense
industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national
origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers and
of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this
order, to provide for the full and equitable participation of all
workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, or national origin... 2
He also directed all federal contracting agencies to include in their
defense contracts "a provision obligating the contractor not to dis-
criminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national
origin. . . . "7 This order has served as the foundation for subsequent
orders by other Presidents, and, since 1941, a series of executive orders
"has expanded both the substance of the nondiscrimination obligation and
the number of contractors subject to it.' '8
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
'Definitions of who is an employer, employment agency or labor organization for pur-
poses of the Act are found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b), (c), (d).
'For a comprehensive treatment of the history and effectiveness of the early executive
orders, see M. SOvERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1966).
41d. at 9.
'Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
Old.
71d.
8 Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Con-
tracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 590 (1969). See also SovERN, supra note 3.
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The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not result in a
termination of the executive branch's involvement in the area. On
September 24, 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246'
which, in addition to retaining the nondiscrimination clause of earlier
executive orders, imposed upon contractors the duty to undertake "af-
firmative action" 10 to ensure equal job opportunity. The coverage, pro-
cedure and sanctions provided in Executive Order 11246 are quite dif-
ferent from what Congress provided in Title VII.11 This Comment
will examine the effect of the affirmative action requirement on govern-
ment contractors, labor unions and minority workers.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246
IN GENERAL
Executive Order 11246 places two major obligations on employers
subject to its provisions. The first is that contractors not "discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. '"12 This is basically the same
language which President Roosevelt used in Executive Order 8802 thirty
years ago. It imposes a negative duty, a duty to refrain from discrimi-
nating. The second obligation is of more recent origin and requires
that contractors "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' u  This
"affirmative action" requirement first appeared in Executive Order
10925, issued by President Kennedy in 1961.14 In addition to expending
the obligation of contractors, Executive Order 10925 was also the first
of the series of executive orders to provide strong and specific penalties
for noncompliance. 15
President Johnson, while retaining the contractor obligations and
the sanctions of the Kennedy order, changed the administrative structure
of the entire compliance program. He assigned overall supervisory
authority to the Secretary of Labor and authorized him to adopt rules
and regulations to achieve the purposes of the Order.16 Pursuant to
this authority, the Secretary of Labor established the Office of Federal
9Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 402 (Supp. 1970).
'°This was not the first executive order to impose this obligation. President Kennedy
issued Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) which contained an affirma-
tive action requirement.
"lFor a discussion of Title VII's provisions, see Bender, Title Y11 Seven Years After,
this issue.
"Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202 (1), supra note 9.
Isid.
"Exec. Order No. 10925, supra note 10.
"SovERN, supra note 3.
"Exec. Order No. 11246 § 201, supra note 9.
"Department of Labor, Secretary's Order No. 26-65, 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
[Vol. 32
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Contract Compliance (OFCC) in 1966,17 which then issued rules and
regulations governing the compliance program.18
WHO IS SUBJECT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246?
The extent of coverage of Executive Order 11246 is found in Parts
II and III of the Order and in the regulations issued by the OFCC.
Section 202 of the Order provides that "all Government contracting
agencies" except those "exempted in accordance with Section 204" shall
include the nondiscrimination and affirmative action clauses in every
Government contract entered into. Section 204 gives the Secretary
of Labor authority to "exempt a contracting agency from the require-
ment of including any or all of (the obligations) in any specific contract,
subcontract, or purchase order", but only when he deems that "special
circumstances in the national interest so require." Section 204 also
gives the Secretary authority to establish rules and regulations for the
exemption of certain classes of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase
orders,
(1) whenever work is to be or has been performed outside the
United States and no recruitment of workers within the limits of the
United States is involved; (2) for standard commercial supplies
or raw materials; (3) involving less than specified amounts of
money or specified numbers of workers; or (4) to the extent that
they involve subcontracts below a specified tier.'
Section 301 provides that federally assisted construction is also
subject to the Order. Thus, "all construction contracts paid for in whole
or in part with funds obtained from the Federal Government or bor-
rowed on the credit of the Federal Government" are covered.
The regulations issued in pursuance of the authority in the Order
futher define the coverage. Contracts and subcontracts, other than
bills of lading, for less than $10,000 are exempt. 20 Contracts and sub-
contracts for indefinite quantities are exempt only if the purchaser
has reason to believe that the amount to be ordered in any year will be
less than $10,000.21
It is obvious that coverage of federal contracts and federally assisted
construction directly affects a large number of the nation's employers.
However, it is important to note that Executive Order 11246 applies only
to contractors/employers. It does not apply to unions, where much
of the discrimination actually occurs. In this respect, Executive Order
11246 differs from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
applies generally to employers, employment agencies and labor organi-
zations.
1841 C.F.R. § 60 (1970).
'
9Exec. Order No. 11246 § 204, supra note 9.
m41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a) (1970). The amount of the contract, not the amount of fed-
eral assistance, is the determining figure.
-Id. § 60-1.5(b).
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OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTORS
What is a contractor covered by the Order required to do to be
in compliance? In addition to the previously mentioned duty not to
discriminate, and the duty to take affirmative action (discussed in more
detail in part III of this Comment), the Order requires that the con-
tractor (1) state in all solicitations or advertisements for employees
that all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment
without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin; (2) advise each
labor union or representative of workers with which he has a col-
lective bargaining agreement of his commitments under the Order;
(3) comply with all provisions of the Order and of the rules, regulations,
and orders of the Secretary of Labor; (4) furnish all information and
reports required by the Order and regulations and permit access to
his books and records for purposes of ascertaining compliance; (5) in-
clude the obligations imposed by the Order in every subcontract or
purchase order, unless specifically exempted.22
The regulations provide for extensive regular reporting and also
give the Director of the OFCC authority to request "other information"
prior to, or after an award, or both. 23 When the contractor or sub-
contractor has a collective bargaining agreement with a union or other
agency for the referral of workers, the report must include information
as to such union's or agency's practices and policies affecting com-
pliance by the contractor. But where the information sought is within
the exclusive possession of the labor union and the union refuses to
provide it, a proviso allows the contractor to set forth this fact and
what effort he has made to obtain such information. 24 Also, the con-
tracting agency or the Secretary of Labor has authority to direct that
the contractor submit a signed statement from any union or referral
agency with which he deals to the effect that the union's or referral
agency's practices and policies do not discriminate and that the signer
will affirmatively cooperate in the implementation of the Order. Where
the union or referral agency refuses to execute such a statement, the
contractor shall so certify in his report and set forth what efforts have
been made to secure such a statement. 2
5
ENFORCEMENT
Section 205 provides that each contracting agency "shall be pri-
marily responsible for obtaining compliance with the rules, regulations,
and orders of the Secretary of Labor with respect to contracts entered
into by such agency. . . ." Each agency is required to appoint or de-
signate compliance officers from among its own personnel. "It shall
be the duty of such officers to seek compliance with the objectives of
mExec. Order No. 11246 § 202, supra note 9.
-41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(b) (2) (1970).
"Exec. Order No. 11246 § 203 (c), supra note 9.
-Id. § 203 (d).
[Vol. 32
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this Order by conference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasioA. "'26
The OFCC serves in a coordinating and supervising function. It also de-
signates certain agencies as "compliance agencies." Generally, these
are the agencies that do the greatest dollar volume with a particular con-
tractor. They are assigned to enforce the Order for a particular com-
pany as a whole, thus, eliminating duplication by separate agencies
monitoring the same contractor.
The regulations also provide for "compliance reviews" to be made
regularly by the compliance agency. 27 The purposes of the review is
to determine if the prime contractor or subcontractor is fulfilling his
obligations under the Order. Where deficiencies are found to exist,
the regulations state that compliance should first be sought "through
conciliation and persuasion. "28
In addition to compliance reviews, provision is made for the handling
of specific complaints. Any employee or applicant for employment with
a covered contractor may file a complaint alleging discrimination.2 9
The complaint must be in writing, and be filed with the agency or
OFCC within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination." In
most cases complaints will be investigated by the agency. But the
OFCC may assume jurisdiction of a complaint and conduct its own
investigation.3l Where, after investigation, it appears to the agency
or the OFCC that a violation of the equal employment opportunity clause
has occured, the regulations direct that "informal means" should be
used to resolve it whenever possible.3 2 Where the informal fail, provision
is made for a hearing for the contractor before the agency or the OFCC.'3
A contractor found guilty of a violation after hearing is then subject
to the sanctions for noncompliance discussed in part E of this paper.
SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
It is in this area that the contract between Title VII and Executive
Order 11246 is most clearly presented. The only direct remedies avail-
able to the EEOC are "informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion. ' ' 34 The Order also provides that infomal methods be
tried first, but, unlike Title VII, provides for sanctions and penalties
in the event the informal methods fail. Section 209 of the Order provides
that either the Secretary of Labor or the contracting agency may:
"Id. § 205. The informal means of obtaining compliance are similar to those provided
in Title VII.
241 C.F.R. § 60-1.20 (1970).
1Id.
-Id. § 60-1.21.
Id.
-
1 d. § 60-1.25.
-Id. § 60-1.24.
-1d. § 60-1.26.
"442 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). Suits may also be brought by the Attorney General
in certain instances. See, Bender, supra note 11.
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(1) Publish, or cause to be published, the names of contractors or
unions which it has concluded have complied or have failed to comply
with the provisions of this Order or of the rules, regulations, and
orders of the Secretary of Labor.
(2) Recommend to the Department of Justice that, in cases in which
there is substantial or material violation or the threat of sub-
stantial or material violation of the contractual provisions set forth
in Section 202 of this Order, appropriate proceedings be brought
to enforce those provisions, including the enjoining, within the
limitations of applicable law, of organizations, individuals, or groups
who prevent directly or indirectly, or seek to prevent directly or
indirectly, compliance with the provisions of this Order.
(3) Recommend to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
of the Department of Justice that appropriate proceedings be in-
stituted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
(4) Recommend to the Department of Justice that criminal pro-
ceedings be brought for the furnishing of false information to any
contracting agency or to the Secretary of Labor as the case may be.
(5) Cancel, terminate, suspend, or cause to be cancelled, terminated,
or suspended, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for
failure of the contractor or subcontractor to comply with the non-
discrimination provisions of the contract. Contracts may be can-
celled, terminated, or suspended absolutely or continuance of con-
tracts may be conditioned upon a program for future compliance
approved by the contracting agency.
(6) Provide that any contracting agency shall refrain from enter-
ing into further contracts, or extensions or other modifications of
existing contracts, with any noncomplying contractor, until such
contractor has satisfied the Secretary of Labor that such contractor
has established and will carry out personnel employment policies
in compliance with the provisions of this Order.
Nature of the Affirmative Action Requirement
What must a contractor do to comply with the Order? What does
"affirmative action" mean? Neither Executive Order 10925, which
first used the term, nor Executive Order 11246, its successor, define
it. Section 202 (1) of 11246 states that affirmative action
shall include, but not be limited to the following: Employment,
upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment ad-
vertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of
compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship.
Thus, in at least the above mentioned areas, the contractor is required
to take affirmative action to ensure that discrimination is eliminated.
But what is it that the contractor must do?
In response to many complaints about lack of specificity of the
affirmative action requirement, the Labor Department, through the
OFCC, issued additional regulations effective January 30, 1970.3 5 These
regulations outline the required contents of affirmative action programs
and then provide "suggested" methods of implementing and judging an
acceptable affirmative action program. The purpose of an affirmative
action program is defined in terms of obtaining "results" through "good
faith effort" by contractors.3 6 The contractor is expected to analyze
-41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1970).
-1d. § 60-2.10.
[Vol. 32
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 32 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
1971] THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REQUIREMENT 255
the situation, taking into account such factors as the percentage of minor-
ity population in the area, the percentage of minority work force as
compared with the total work force, the size of the unemployed minority
work force and the availability of minorities having requisite skills
in an area in which the contractor can reasonably recruit. After making
this analysis, the contractor must design "goals, timetables and af-
firmative action commitments" to correct any identifiable deficiencies.3"
"Where deficiencies exist and where numbers or percentage are relevant
in developing corrective action, the contractor shall establish and set
forth specific goals and timetables."'38 (emphasis added)
The suggestions for implementation deal primarily with methods
which the contractor should use to communicate his equal employment
opportunity policy to his own supervisors and employees, to unions
and other recruiting sources, etc. It is also suggested that each con-
tractor appoint an executive to direct the company equal employment
programs and develop audit and reporting systems which will measure
the effectiveness of the program.
Whether the contractor is able to meet his goals and timetables is
not the sole factor in determining if he is in compliance with the
Order.
Rather each contractor's compliance posture shall be reviewed and
determined by reviewing the contents of his program, the extent
of his adherence to his program, and his good faith efforts to
make his program work toward the realization of the program's
goals within the timetables set for completion.'
When contractors fail to come up with adequate affirmative action
programs on their own, the government may do it for them. An example
of this is the highly controversial Philadephia Plan.
40
Pursuant to his authority under Executive Order 11246 and the
regulations, the Secretary of Labor issued orders in June and September
of 1969 providing for an affirmative action plan for construction con-
tractors in the Philadelphia area. The Plan was formulated after a
Labor Department study revealed that although the overall minority
groups representation in the construction industry in the Philadelphia
area was thirty percent, minority representation in six high paying
building trades was approximately one percent. This small percentage
of minority workers was attributed to the following factors:
(a) Contractors hire a new employee complement for each con-
struction job on the basis of referral by the construction craft
unions;
-'Id. § 60-2.11.
wid.
-Id. § 60-2.13.
'For detailed discussions of what is now properly termed the "Revised Philadelphia
Plan," see Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades; An Analy-
sis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970) and Comment, The Legal-
ity of the "Revised Philadelphia Plan", 30 MD. L. REV. 114 (1970).
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(b) The refusal of certain of these unions to admit Negroes to
membership or apprenticeship programs;
(c) A preference in work referrals to union members and to per-
sons who had work experience under union contracts.'
Public hearings were held to determine the availability of minority
group persons and the impact of the program on existing labor forces.
The Plan was then issued, establishing ranges within which the minority
group employment goals should be set in the six trades. It provided that
in the first year, employment ranges vary between 4 and 9 percent
and for yearly increases until in the fourth and last year the ranges
would be between 19 and 26 percent.42
The Plan provided that if a contractor met his goals he would be
presumed to be in compliance. However, the obligation to meet the
goals was not absolute and a contractor who failed to meet his goals
could still be in compliance if he could demonstrate that he made every
good faith effort to meet his commitments.43
The Plan's legality has already been challenged. In Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor,44 a Federal
District Court in Pennsylvania upheld the Plan against allegations of
contractors that it violated the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and was therefore illegal. Specifically, the contractors contended
that the provisions of the Plan for specified goals for minority group
participation 1) imposed "quotas" 2) required "preferential treatment"
for minority workers and 3) constituted "reverse discrimination", all
of which are prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The language
in Title VII which they relied on to support their allegations is found in
Section 703.4
5
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect tohis compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ...
(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor management committee subject to this title to grant pre-
ferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
"Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp.
1002, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2Order from Arthur A. Fletcher and John L. Wilks, September 23, 1969, United States
Dept. of Labor, 115 Cong. Ree. 17.135 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969)..
"41 C.F.R. § 60-2.13.
"Contractors Association, supra note 41.
"42 U.S.C. § 20 00e-3 (1964).
[Vol. 32
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an inmbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin employed by any employer ...
The court held that the Plan "is no more or less than a means for
implementation of the affirmative action obligations of Execution Order
11246.''46 It does not violate Title VII in that it does not require a
contractor to hire a definite percentage of a minority group. "It merely
requires that he makes every good faith effort to meet his commitment
to attain certain goals. If a contractor is unable to meet the goal but
has exhibited good faith, then the imposition of sanctions . . . would be
improper and subject to judicial review. ' 4T The case is now pending
before the Third Circuit.
It is doubtful that the controversy over the legality of the Plan
is over. At least one other Federal District court has also upheld the
legality of a Philadelphia-type plan,48 but the question probably will not
be settled until the Supreme Court decides it. Meanwhile, the govern-
ment is going forward with Philadelphia-type plans in many of the
nation's largest cities.
Effect of Executive Order 11246
CONTRACTORS
The Federal Government has made clear its intention to end dis-
crimination in employment. Congress, through Title VII, has imposed
obligations not to discriminate on employers, employment agencies and
labor organizations. The President, however, has chosen to utilize the
government's purchasing power to achieve the same end. The Executive
Order places the burden of its obligations directly on the contractor,
who must comply if he wishes to do business with the government.
And the obligations which he must meet have become very real. No
longer can a contractor get by on a simple statement on non-discrimi-
nation. Not even the fact that he does not discriminate among the em-
ployees referred to him by a union will suffice if the union only refers
whites. The Order places prime responsibility on the contractor be-
cause he is the only party who can be directly controlled through the
power of the government contraet. The government in effect has
said that it does not want to listen to the contractor's problems with
the unions or other referral agencies. If he wants a contract, it is
his responsibility to see that the end "result" of his employment
practices is non-discriminatory.
This, of course, presents problems for the contractor. He is faced
with a maze of rules and regulations which are still vague about how
he is to achieve the designated goals. He is forced to devote a sub-
"Contractors Association, supra note 41 at 1009.
4TId. at 1010.
'Joyce v. McRane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (N.J. 1970).
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stantial amount of time and effort to studying and complying with their
requirements. All this will not come without some expense and the
result will be that the cost of non-discrimination will be passed to the
government in the form of higher contract prices.
The contractor will undoubtedly encounter resistence to his af-
firmative action plan from the unions with which he has to deal. The
unions will not be eager to lose the control they have enjoyed over who
will work. Yet the Labor Department has made it clear that where
contractors are unable to meet their goals through the union referral
halls, they are expected to disregard the exclusive hiring-hall agreement
and go outside the union to secure minority workers.49  Such action
could result in a union charge that the contractor has breached the
collective bargaining agreement. However, one writer who has con-
sidered this problem concludes that such a charge would be unsuccess-
ful. 50 Ho reasons that federal labor policy, as evidenced by recent
decisions under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII, is
clearly opposed to discrimination by unions. Section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act
gave the courts power to fashion a body of contract-enforcement
law that would be appropriate for collective bargaining relationships
and applicable in both state and federal courts. In making decisions
under the section, courts are to give heavy weight to general
federal labor law policies.'
'Where the contractor is unable to reach his goals through union referrals,
the reason is usually that the union is discriminating against minority
groups. "In such a case, a federal or state court properly exercising
its authority under section 301 should refuse to enforce the referral-hall
agreement. ''52
That the contractor will not be able to rely on a collective bargain-
ing agreement with the unions to avoid his obligations under the Order
is evidenced in Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College.53 There a con-
tractor submitted a bid on mechanical work in connection with campus
construction which was partially federally funded. His bid was the
lowest submitted. He also submitted an affirmative action plan, but
it failed to provide unequivocally that he would implement an acceptable
program. The contractor attempted to make equality in hiring subject
to the availability of minority workers and dependent on referral of
all labor from the union with which he had a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's holding that
"U.S. Dept. of Labor, Revised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Requirements of Executive Order 11246 for Federally-Involved
Construction (June 27, 1969).
wLeiken, supra note 40.
51Id. at 110.
"
2Id.
53238 N.E.2d 839, aff'd 19 Ohio St.2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 1004 (1970).
[Vol. 32
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officials of the college did not abuse their discretion when they re-
jected the contractor's bid, even though it was the lowest submitted.
The court relied on the fact that under the bidding regulations, the col-
lege was obligated to accept the lowest and best bid and that since the
contractor had failed to comply with state and federal policy with
regard to employment discrimination, his bid was not the lowest and
best bid. Specifically, he did not meet the standards imposed by the
Order.
Another recent case, Trustees v. Volpe Construction Co.,54 helps
illustrate the effect of the Order on contractors. An educational in-
stitution sought declaratory relief in Massachusetts state court in re-
gard to a contract entered into for construction of a residence hall.
The University alleged that the contractor had breached the nondis-
crimination and affirmative action clauses contained in its contract.
The allegation stated that 1) the contractor employed a work force
of about 90 persons on the project of which only four were Negroes and
only two were Puerto Ricans, 2) a sufficient number of Negroes and
Puerto Ricans lived within the area such that, if the contractor had
not discriminated and had taken affirmative action to insure that persons
were employed without regard to their race, color, or national origin,
the number of minority group workers employed by the contractor
would be approximately 20% of the total number of persons so em-
ployed. They also alleged that the contractor had furnished the Uni-
versity with information that was "incomplete, misleading and false."
The lower court sustained the contractor's demurrer. On appeal,
the contractor argued, inter alia, that the Massachusetts court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case since the enforcement of compliance
with Executive Order 11246 is exclusively within the jurisdiction of
federal courts and agencies. But the court held that just because the
government may enforce a specific provision under the Executive Order
does not mean that the University is unable to enforce a similar pro-
vision. The University has a right to enforce the provisions of the
contract between it and the defendant contractor. "The fact that a
specific provision in the contract is covered by a regulation of a Federal
agency regarding the enforcement of that regulation does not deprive
the University of the right to enforce the contractual obligations. '55
The case was remanded to be heard on the merits. But its significance
lies in the fact that the court found that the provisions of the Order
were not the exclusive means of enforcement and did not bar an
action in state court on a breach of contract theory by a party other
than the federal government.
These cases illustrate that the obligations imposed by the Order
are indeed real and that they can be enforced. Further, if the con-
'264 N.E.2d 676 (1970).
"
5Id. at 682.
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tractors do not set up acceptable affirmative action programs on their
own, they will be faced with Philadelphia type plans, with the govern-
ment setting their goals for them. As discussed earlier, the question
of the legality of the Philadelphia Plan has already been resolved in
favor of the Plan in Federal District Court. A plan similar to the Phil-
adelphia Plan was likewise upheld in Joyce v. McRane.5 6 The court's
holding was basically the same as that in Contractors Association of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor," saying that since the plan
sets up goals for minority employment, rather than quotas, and no
sanctions can be imposed on a contractor who does not meet his goals
where there has been a good faith attempt to meet them, it does not
violate Title VII's ban on preferential treatment.
While the ultimate test of the legality of such plans will have to
await a Supreme Court ruling, the fact remains that for the present
at least, contractors will have to comply with them. This means they
must use their "good faith efforts" to achieve "results". The desired
results are stated in terms of "goals" - specifed percentages of the
work force which should be composed of minority workers. The regu-
lations have been interpreted as not imposing a prohibited quota
system. 58 But while such plans do not on their face impose a quota
system, the practical effect in a great many cases is that they will re-
sult in a quota system or at least preferential treatment.
The contractor knows that the simplest way for him to avoid the
imposition of sanctions for noncompliance is to make sure that the
percentage of minority workers in his employment compares favorably
with the percentage of minority workers in the total work force of
the area. If the total work force contains 30% minority workers, the
contractor knows that if he has between 25 and 35 minority workers
on his force of 100, the government will presume that he is in compliance.
If he has already hired 90 of his 100 needed men, and only 15 of them
are minority workers, a non-minority applicant for one of the remain-
ing 10 jobs does not have a chance. And the reason is because of his
color or race. This is the concept of "reverse discrimination" which
Title VII expressly forbids.5 9 On its face, the Executive Order forbids
it also, 60 but it cannot be denied that it does and will occur. What the
contractor is supposed to do when he is looking for those last 10 men,
is to select them without regard to race, color, etc. and then, when he
fails to meet his goals under his affirmative action plan, all he has to do
to be in compliance with the Order is demonstrate his "good faith
attempt" to meet those goals.6 But this involves more hassle and there
6Joyce, supra note 48.
"Contractors Association, supra note 41.
'Id.; Joyce, supra note 48.
142 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1964).
'Exec. Order No. 11246 § 202 (1), supra note 9.
-41 C.F.R. § 60-2.13.
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is always the chance that his good faith attempt will not be found to be
good enough. Faced with this choice, many contractors may find it
much easier to just make sure they have the "proper" percentage of
minority workers in their employ.
UNIONS
It has already been observed that although unions are responsible
for much of the employment discrimination, 62 they are not directly
covered by the Executive Order. And in the past, before there was a
requirement that the contractor take affirmative action, the unions
really were not affected by the Executive Orders. Since they were not
covered, they went on discriminating in their membership and in their
requirement that they not discriminate among applicants for jobs, really
had no one to discriminate against since the unions referred only whites.
In this sense, it can be said that the affirmative action obligation imposed
on contractors is really an attempt by the government to do indirectly that
which it could not do directly.
Executive Order 11246 does refer specifically to unions in several
places. A contractor is required to include in his compliance reports
statements of union practices and policies.63 He also can be directed to
obtain a statement from the union that it does not discriminate and that
it will affirmatively cooperate in implementing the Order.6 4  If the
union refuses to give information or to sign such a statement the con-
tractor is to report this fact and the efforts he made to get the in-
formation or statement.6 5 These provisions were probably meant
to convey the veiled threat that an uncooperative union will jeopar-
dize the . .. contractor's chances of getting and keeping govern-
ment work, which would in turn jeopardize the jobs of the workers
represented by the recalcitrant union.'
Unions are also mentioned in the section providing for sanctions.
The Secretary of Labor or the contracting agency may publish the
names of unions which it has concluded have failed to comply with the
Order. 67 The Secretary may also recommend to the Justice Department
that an injunction be sought against "organizations, individuals or
groups who prevent directly or indirectly or seek to prevent directly
or indirectly compliance with the provisions of this Order. '"68 Recom-
mendations may be made to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission or the Department of Justice to institute proceeding under Title
12This is, of course, a generalization and is not meant to imply that all unions engage
or have engaged in discriminatory practices.
'
3 Exec. Order No. 11246 § 203 (c), supra note 9.
-Id. § 203 (d).
65d.
"SovEN, supra note 3 at 128.
O'Exec. Order No. 11246 § 209 (a), supra note 9.
6Id.
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VII if the Secretary or the contracting agency finds that a union is
violating that Act.69
But perhaps the greatest effect on unions may come about through
proceedings against the contractor. If a union's discriminatory hiring
and referral practices prevent the contractor from complying with
the Order, the sanctions which can be imposed against the contractor
will also hurt the union. Termination of a government contract and
blacklisting of the contractor results in loss of jobs for union members.
Thus, it is in the union's own interest to help the contractor comply
with the Order, and although the union might not admit and refer
minority workers out of a true sense of nondiscrimination, the "result"
will at least be in keeping with the government policy.
The Joyce case discussed earlier provides some insight into the
effect of the Order on the union. The action was brought against the
Treasurer and the Director of Purchasing for the State of New Jersey
by contractors and contractor associations to obtain determination of
the validity of an affirmative action plan promulgated by the state of
New Jersey in compliance with the Order. The contractors were seeking
a declaratory judgment to determine whether they could by law comply
with the instructions to bidders containing the affirmative action obli-
gation. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging the validity of the
affirmative action plan and naming as third party defendants all
labor unions having jurisdiction over the labor force in the area. The
unions contended that they were not proper parties and that, absent
any evidence of discrimination, a union is free to pick and choose its
members as it sees fit.
The court held that since the unions were for the most part re-
sponsible for supplying the workers to the contractors, any matter that
deals with the regulation of this work force must. include them asproper
parties.
To rule otherwise would defeat the intention of Executive Order
11246, in that the Government could bind the contractor to af-
firmative action yet this would be meaningless as the contractor
could contract away this obligation thraugh collective bargaining
agreements with the unions.0
The court agreed that, absent any evidence of discrimination, a
union is free to pick and choose its members as it sees fit. But, the
court noted, here the findings preceding the affirmative action plan
indicated that discrimination had occurred. And to the union's contention
that the court can not tamper with the union membership roles, the
court answered that it could, citing cases where a court has not hesitated
in the face of racial discrimination to take affirmative action by means
of injunction to see that there is a racial balance in the work force. 71
1Od.
"Joyce, supra note 48 at 1291.
1Id. at 1292.
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This case illustrates that although the Order does not apply directly
to unions, is certainly affects them and provides a means to remedy
their past discriminatory practices. The regulations recognize that
unions will be affected and provide for hearings to be held in certain
instances.
Whenever compliance with the equal opportunity clause may neces-
sitate a revision of a collective bargaining agreement, the labor
union or unions which are parties to usch an agreement shall be
given an adequate opportunity to present their views to the Di-
re tor.72
MINORITY WORKERS
The amount of benefit to be derived by the minority workers is of
course dependent on the success of the Order on employers and unions.
If the Order's requirements are closely monitored and its sanctions
unhesitatingly applied to noncooperative contractors and unions, there
is no doubt that it will go a long way toward eliminating employment
discrimination.
The minority worker must depend on the government to enforce
the Order's obligations. True, he can file a complaint with the con-
tracting agency or the OFCC, but then it is up to the government to
decide what to do with it. It has also been held that the Order does
not create a right to bring a private civil action to achieve compliance.13
For more direct remedies in the area of discrimination, the minority
worker could proceed under Title VII or the National Labor Relations
Act.
CONCLUSION
While the affirmative action requirement is likely to result in some
preferential treatment of minority workers, it is submitted that the
white workers' interest in true nondiscrimination workers in ending
a problem which has been with us too long. Even if the government
could enforce the duty not to discriminate, without the additional re-
quirement of affirmative action, it would take too long to solve the
problem. The blacks and other minorities, because of their knowledge
of past union practices would not go in great numbers to request
membership. And even those who did would still face an apprenticeship
program of five years or so. Under these circumstances, it would take at
least a generation to achieve minority representation in the work force.
But that is not soon enough. The affirmative action requirement
promises quicker results, and may be justifiable for that reason.
GREGORY L. HANSON
7241 C.F.R. § 60-1.9(a) (1970).
"
3Farkas v. Texas Instrument Company, 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Farmes v. Phila-
delphia Electric Company, 329 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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